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Oxford cognitive science series
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Titre : |
Concepts : Where cognitive science went wrong |
Type de document : |
texte imprimé |
Auteurs : |
Jerry A. Fodor, Auteur |
Editeur : |
Oxford : Oxford University Press |
Année de publication : |
1998 |
Collection : |
Oxford cognitive science series |
Importance : |
([XII]-174 p.) |
Présentation : |
couv. ill. |
Format : |
24 cm |
ISBN/ISSN/EAN : |
978-0-19-823636-8 |
Langues : |
Anglais (eng) |
Mots-clés : |
Concepts Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Concept formation Philosophy. |
Résumé : |
The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again. |
Concepts : Where cognitive science went wrong [texte imprimé] / Jerry A. Fodor, Auteur . - [S.l.] : Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998 . - ([XII]-174 p.) : couv. ill. ; 24 cm. - ( Oxford cognitive science series) . ISBN : 978-0-19-823636-8 Langues : Anglais ( eng)
Mots-clés : |
Concepts Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Concept formation Philosophy. |
Résumé : |
The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again. |
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Exemplaires (2)
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FLE-10758 | 100-95.1 | Ouvrage | Faculté des Langues étrangères | 100 - Philosophie, Parapsychologie et Occultisme, Psychologie | Exclu du prêt |
FLE-10759 | 100-95.2 | Ouvrage | Faculté des Langues étrangères | 100 - Philosophie, Parapsychologie et Occultisme, Psychologie | Disponible |